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Executive Summary
Ethiopia has suffered from frequent disasters such 
as droughts, famines, epidemics, floods, landslides, 
earthquakes, civil wars, and mass displacement, as 
well as rapid declines in major export commodity 
prices. The government and the international aid 
community can help reduce the negative effects of 
these shocks on food security for vulnerable 
populations with a social protection strategy, which 
can include prevention of shocks, ex ante social 
insurance, and ex post social assistance. Social pro­
tection helps vulnerable populations manage their 
risks better and helps to create the link between 
relief and development.
Policy options for social assistance programs that 
increase food security include targeted or general 
cash, in-kind, or voucher transfers; cash or in-kind 
conditional transfers [school feeding, employment 
guarantee scheme, food for training]; price subsi­
dies; and programs for the vulnerable. Social insur­
ance options include cash or in-kind reserves, rural 
credit and microfinance, insurance schemes, liveli­
hood diversification, and public works for the 
construction of infrastructure programs. The gov­
ernment also has the option to pursue agricultural 
policies that will minimize exposure to shocks, such 
as providing input subsidies for exportable com­
modities or moving away from export-led devel­
opment and toward food self-sufficiency. Different 
social protection measures have varying levels of 
domestic and international support and are effec­
tive for targeting different groups of vulnerable 
people in Ethiopia. In response to the 2002 
drought, the Government of Ethiopia revised its 
Food Security Strategy [FSS] and implemented a 
Productive Safety Net Programme [PSNP] in 20 0 4  
that includes cash transfers and a food-for-work 
[FFW] public works program.
Your assignment is to design a new social protec­
tion program for the Government of Ethiopia that 
incorporates various forms of social assistance and 
social insurance, taking into account the different 
interests of stakeholders, the nature of the risk, 
coping strategies, and the poverty the vulnerable 
are facing.
Background
Income and Price Shocks in Ethiopia
Ethiopia is known for the many droughts, floods, 
famines, and wars that have raged there for the 
past 40  years. Since 1965 there have been 15 major 
droughts in Ethiopia, with four consecutive years 
of drought beginning in 1999. The worst flash 
floods in Ethiopia's history hit in August 2006 , 
rendering 140,000 people homeless. After a 30- 
year civil war Ethiopia granted independence to 
Eritrea in 1991, but a border conflict broke out 
from 1998 to 2 0 0 0 , leading to massive internal dis­
placement in both countries as civilians fled the war 
zone.
Income shocks resulting from the failure of har­
vests due to war and weather are not the only 
disasters Ethiopians face. The Ethiopian economy is 
based on agriculture, which contributes 48 percent 
to gross domestic product [GDP] and employs 78 
percent of the population [World Bank 2006a], 
The major agricultural export crop is coffee. Recent 
expansions in global coffee production have caused 
a price shock for Ethiopian farmers. In 2001 coffee 
prices plummeted, and coffee on the international 
market was worth an inflation-adjusted 16 percent 
of what it was in 1980 [Oxfam 2004], Ethiopians 
have experienced a crippling decrease in foreign 
exchange earnings [U.S. Department of State 2006], 
severely decreasing the country's ability to buy 
food imports.
What is the effect of these income and price 
shocks? The link between poverty and vulnerability 
depends on how great the risks are and what assets 
are available to cope with risks [World Bank 2001], 
Using household panel data, Dercon [2003] shows 
that shocks have a persistent negative effect on 
growth in Ethiopia. In 2004 , 44 percent of 
Ethiopians were living below the poverty line 
[World Bank 2006b], Ethiopia is a least-developed 
country, ranked 170th out of 177 countries in the 
United Nations Development Programme's Human 
Development Index for 2005. It has one of the 
world's highest incidences of malnutrition and one 
of the lowest primary-education enrollment ratios. 
GDP per capita was US$141 in 2005, about 20 
percent of the average for Sub-Saharan Africa 
[World Bank 2006a],
At the 1996 World Food Summit, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
[FAO] defined food security as follows: "Food 
security exists when all people, at all times, have 
access to sufficient safe and nutritious food to 
meet their dietary needs and food preferences for 
an active and healthy life" [FAO 1996], A good 
definition of food security is one that incorporates 
the various levels at which food security can be 
obtained: the national level, the household level, 
and the individual level. This multi-level concept 
includes food availability, food accessibility, and 
food utilization. More recently, the notion of food 
security has expanded to encompass the stability of 
the food supply. National food availability depends 
on the production of food. If there is a production 
gap and supply cannot meet demand, food avail­
ability depends on food imports or food aid. 
Ethiopia consistently faces a production and import 
gap in meeting the demand for food, and emer­
gency food assistance had to be provided to at 
least 8.6 million people in 2005, more than 10 
percent of the population.
Informal Coping Strategics
Households in Africa try to mitigate some of their 
risks by forgoing income in exchange for risk 
reduction and by using informal coping strategies. 
For example, they build social relationships, diver­
sify incomes, take children out of school, reduce 
meals, save, sell assets, and avoid risky yet highly 
productive agricultural techniques [World Bank 
2001). Informal coping strategies to deal with 
shocks are often costly and insufficient. Taking 
children out of school and selling productive assets 
lead to poverty traps. Reardon et al. [1988) report 
that after the 1984 drought in the Sahel, informal 
transfers amounted to only 3 percent of total 
losses for the poorest people. Self-insurance, which 
involves saving during good times and spending 
those savings for consumption during bad times 
[consumption smoothing), is problematic in 
Ethiopia because financial systems are under­
developed and assets are usually in the form of 
livestock. A shock can result in both a decrease in 
earnings as well as lower fertility or death in live­
stock, meaning that savings will not be available 
when they are most needed. Covariant shocks that 
are common to many people at once, like drought, 
war, or pests, alter the terms of trade between 
food and livestock, because everyone sells assets at 
the same time, driving down livestock prices.
During the 1984 famine, relative food prices rose 
by a third in Ethiopia [Dercon 2002).
Safety Nets and Social Protection
Social protection has recently become central in the 
development agenda, because poor people in 
African countries are becoming more and more 
exposed to risks, owing to the AIDS crisis, changes 
in international markets, and endemic natural 
disasters in certain regions [World Bank 2001). 
Safety nets are based on a redistribution of 
resources to the poor to protect their livelihoods 
against poverty traps and to reduce chronic 
poverty by ensuring access to food and reducing 
vulnerability. In Africa, short-term safety nets to 
protect against structural adjustment were devised 
in the 1980s. The idea of social protection is more 
recent and emphasizes state involvement in long­
term development through social assistance and 
social insurance [Adato et al. 2004). The World 
Bank defines social protection as "interventions that 
assist poor individuals, households, and com­
munities to reduce their vulnerabilities by managing 
risks better" [World Bank 2001, i). It encompasses 
both social assistance and social insurance programs 
and emphasizes the coordination between the 
different programs. Social assistance helps people 
after they have faced a shock so they do not fall 
into a poverty trap. Social insurance provides the 
link from relief to development, by creating or 
protecting investments that support long-run 
growth. Within social protection, there is a distinc­
tion between those programs and strategies that 
serve as safety nets (keeping people out of poverty) 
and those that serve as cargo nets (lifting people 
out of poverty) (Barrett and Maxwell 2005). Some 
ex post social assistance programs such as food-for- 
education (FFE) and mother and child health initia­
tives (Barrett and Maxwell 2005) and some ex ante 
social insurance programs such as livelihood 
diversification and rural credit are cargo nets.
An effective social protection strategy is supported 
by coordinated policy initiatives in pursuit of other 
development strategies and should seek to (I) 
reduce or prevent the risk itself, (2) lower the cost 
of insurance against the risk, and (3) promote low- 
cost coping mechanisms during and after a shock 
(World Bank 2001).
Reducing and preventing risk. The government's 
first priority should be to prevent shocks from
taking place. The government should have sound 
macroeconomic, education, rural infrastructure, 
financial, and health policies in place that ensure 
that the poor have access to markets and can build 
human capital. Although weather and natural disas­
ters are not under the government's control, it can 
mitigate the impact of drought by investing in 
water-harvesting programs and education, as well as 
in irrigation facilities. Some epidemics can be mini­
mized through vaccination programs. Landslides 
can be prevented by investing in proper land man­
agement practices. The government can also con­
trol the degree of exposure to commodity shocks. 
The Government of Ethiopia has already taken a 
number of measures to minimize the impact of the 
decline in world coffee prices, including suspending 
taxes on the export of coffee, easing restrictions 
on domestic coffee sales, and advising farmers to 
bring their crop to market. According its 2002 
poverty reduction strategy paper [PRSP], the gov­
ernment has launched an export promotion strat­
egy based on diversification as a way of addressing 
the vulnerability transmitted through international 
prices for exportables.
Lowering the cost o f risk insurance. Social insur­
ance reduces the impact of shocks ex ante—that is, 
before the problem occurs [Gentilini 2006], Such 
insurance programs include public works programs 
[food-for-work] and construction of infrastructure, 
cash or in-kind reserves, insurance schemes, rural 
credit and microfinance, income diversification, and 
preventive supplemental feeding.
In Ethiopia, conditional work programs with long­
term development objectives (public works) are 
called food-for-work (FFW), and programs with 
short-term relief goals are called employment guar­
antee schemes (EGS). The Government of Ethiopia 
commits 80 percent of the food aid it receives to 
FFW social insurance programs. Public works pro­
grams are especially widespread in northern 
Ethiopia, where 57 percent of sample households 
participated in FFW projects, supplying an average 
of 45 days of labor in 2 0 0 0  (Holden et al. 2006).
By guaranteeing a minimum income to all those 
who can work and encouraging sustainable labor 
activities (such as preventing soil nutrient mining 
and excessive forest clearing), FFW programs can 
preserve human capital and, by reducing downside 
risk exposure, encourage asset accumulation and 
adoption of improved technology (Holden et al.
2006). Moreover, because FFW is a transfer, it can 
provide liquidity that helps participants purchase 
inputs that enhance productivity such as improved 
seeds and fertilizer, reduces distress sales of live­
stock and machinery, and helps keep children in 
school. Finally, long-term development can occur 
through the creation of valuable public goods like 
roads, irrigation, and water conservation structures 
that can induce private capital accumulation 
(Holden et al. 2006). This infrastructure also con­
tributes to food price stability as marketing mecha­
nisms improve.
Ethiopia adopted the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP) in 2 0 0 4  with the goal "to shift 
from a relief-oriented to a productive and devel­
opment-oriented safety net" (World Bank 2004). 
Under the PSNP, labor-intensive public works pro­
vide grants to households whose adults participate 
in public works subprojects that are determined 
locally by the beneficiary communities through an 
annual, participatory planning process. Currently 
there is a focus on watershed management, 
through, for instance, the building of micro-dams. 
Direct support through grants is provided to 
households that are labor-poor and cannot partici­
pate. The PSNP aims to reach more than 5 million 
people living in 262 of the most chronically food- 
insecure woredas (districts) in Ethiopia (Andersen 
2005).
Whereas most social assistance programs ensure 
that the population has access to food, programs 
that fall under social insurance, such as strategic 
reserves, can help make sure that food is available. 
Strategic grain reserves became more widespread in 
Africa in the 1980s after recurring shocks threat­
ened national food security in many countries. The 
main function of reserves is to help the population 
cope with food emergencies. They can also serve to 
stabilize prices and provide loans of grain to aid 
organizations if they experience delays in the arrival 
of supplies. Food from reserves that is sold into 
the market should be replenished through pur­
chases in the domestic market following harvest. 
These purchases should be financed by sales from 
the reserve. Donor assistance is also expected to 
help replenish the quantities that are distributed, 
either free or at subsidized prices, to vulnerable 
population groups through relief programs during 
food emergencies (Lynton-Evans 1997).
To deal with risks before they occur, people can 
diversify their livelihoods by combining activities 
with low levels of covariance or by taking up low- 
risk activities, even at the expense of low returns. 
Diversification can occur by taking off-farm wage 
employment or by self-employing in a nonfarm 
activity. A survey of the Tigray region of northern 
Ethiopia found that total off-farm work accounts 
for 35 percent of income; wage employment, 28 
percent; off-farm self-employment, 7 percent; FFW, 
17 percent; manual nonfarm wage work, 9 percent; 
and skilled nonfarm work, 2.2 percent 
[Woldenhanna and Oskam 2001], This finding 
shows that diversification already occurs in Ethiopia 
and that the rural poor often have nonfarm 
incomes. Poor farm households have a stronger 
incentive to diversify their income sources into off- 
farm activities because their farm labor has a lower 
marginal value [Woldenhanna and Oskam 2001],
Low-cost coping mechanisms. Social assistance 
provides ex post [after the problem occurs] mecha­
nisms for coping with shocks [Gentilini 2006], 
Such assistance may include targeted or general 
cash, in-kind, or voucher transfers; conditional 
cash, in-kind, or voucher transfers [such as the 
employment guarantee scheme, food-for-training, 
and food-for-education]; targeted or general pro­
grams for the vulnerable [palliative supplemental 
feeding and mother-child health programs]; and 
subsidized agricultural inputs or subsidized com­
modity prices.
General transfers are given to all members of the 
population, without regard to need, to prevent 
distress sales of productive assets or migration. For 
example, the government might give everyone a 
sack of grain or 50 Birr if a covariant shock has 
affected the whole population and there is no 
access to food. The Government of Ethiopia does 
not, however, currently provide general transfers. 
In contrast, targeted transfers go to those in the 
greatest need. Targeting can be based on geo­
graphical location, demographics [ethnic group, 
gender, or poverty level], or survey data on 
populations.
Conditional transfers are in-kind or cash transfers 
to the needy linked to a certain activity. For exam­
ple, children may receive food during lunchtime if 
they go to school. Participants may receive a trans­
fer in exchange for work [as in the EGS] or for the 
completion of a training program. Conditional
transfers are usually self-targeting [participants 
select themselves into the programs], but in 
Ethiopia the government targets them administra­
tively and the poor must be identified.
Subsidizing fertilizers or other technologies 
increases productivity in absolute terms, which is 
desirable if there is a domestic food shortage. 
Ethiopia stopped subsidizing agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizer in the 1980s under the structural 
adjustment reforms. Fertilizer subsidies were indi­
rectly reintroduced in the 1990s through subsidized 
input credit and state enterprises that distribute 
fertilizer [Delgado et al. 2002], but input subsidies 
are still minor in Ethiopia [especially compared with 
some countries, like Malawi], Input subsidies also 
help farmers who export their produce by reducing 
their costs and thus making their prices more 
competitive on world markets. The government can 
also opt to subsidize consumers by offering a 
commodity price subsidy—that is, subsidizing the 
cost of a commonly consumed food.
Policy Issues
Ideally, the Government of Ethiopia would elimi­
nate all risks and prevent all shocks, but this is not 
realistic in the near future. Ethiopians continue to 
face covariate risks such as AIDS, war, droughts, 
and commodity price volatility, as well as individual 
risks such as illness, gender discrimination, widow­
hood, and old age. As a consequence, the govern­
ment must now implement a social protection 
program that links relief for food security to long­
term development objectives.
The Government of Ethiopia is operating under 
conditions of scarcity. Direct redistribution is not 
fiscally sustainable, because of the large number of 
poor and the low amount of public funds. Needs 
are high, and there are major trade-offs between 
different uses of public funds and limited public 
sector implementation capacity [World Bank 2001], 
Which social protection programs are most appro­
priate, supportive of long-term growth, cost-effec­
tive, and donor-pleasing? Should the government 
focus on prevention, social assistance, or social in­
surance? If shocks are not prevented, the govern­
ment must choose policies that will help the most 
vulnerable people of Ethiopia cope with the most 
catastrophic shocks without crowding out bene­
ficial private actions. Furthermore, the government
must ensure that the programs it adopts benefit 
the vulnerable and are not captured by elites or the 
middle class.
Different stakeholders within Ethiopia each want 
the government to implement the programs that 
benefit them the most. At the same time, donors 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will 
decide what kinds of programs are politically 
acceptable to them. For example, donors might 
resist policies that distort trade, such as input sub­
sidies. They are likely to pick programs through 
which they can control the use of their funds. 
Donors also have an incentive to impose condi­
tionality on social assistance programs so that they 
have evidence that recipients are spending transfers 
as intended and not irresponsibly. Conditional 
transfers allow donors to feel as if they are influ­
encing behavioral changes associated with less 
poverty [Schuber and Slater 2006).
When designing social protection programs that 
involve transfers, the government needs to address 
the following issues: Should transfers be provided 
conditionally (like EGS) or unconditionally? Should 
people be paid in kind or in cash? Should programs 
target specific populations or be available to all 
citizens? Three questions arise with regard to 
conditional transfers: Will service delivery agencies 
(government-administered education and health 
services) be able to meet the additional demand 
entailed for people to meet conditions? Will the 
social welfare administrations be able to meet the 
additional administrative demands related to condi­
tionalities? And will it be cost-effective to impose 
conditionality, taking into account the administra­
tive costs of administering conditionality (Schuber 
and Slater 2006)?
Whereas social assistance programs and FFW 
ensure access to food, strategic grain reserves can 
contribute to food security by ensuring the avail­
ability of food. According to the PRSP, issues 
facing Ethiopia are the purpose and size of the stra­
tegic reserve under favorable conditions, depending 
on the cost of holding stock and the possibility of 
exports. Should more emphasis be placed on estab­
lishing a foreign exchange fund, financed by higher 
export sales, as an integral part of strategic 
arrangements? Would donors give aid to Ethiopia, 
knowing it is only being stored for future use? 
Since the crisis of 1987/88, donor confidence in the 
strategic grain reserve has eroded owing to
unauthorized drawings. Since 1992 donors have 
pledged to replenish the reserve, although it 
remains well below the target level. Despite 
increased government commitment of funds, donor 
confidence remains fragile and the reserve remains 
dependent on donor support (Jones 1994).
Stakeholders
The Government of Ethiopia
The government will want to promote long-term 
economic growth and pursue social protection 
programs that help foster this growth in the most 
efficient and effective manner. It will also be impor­
tant for Ethiopia to satisfy the needs of donor 
governments, because the country relies heavily on 
aid and will need even more assistance to imple­
ment a new social protection policy. In the National 
Food Security Strategy, one of the government's 
main objectives is to end food aid and reduce its 
dependency on donors. Likewise, the government 
wants to minimize the dependency of its citizens on 
aid. The government may also be concerned with 
issues of decentralization. For example, FFW 
projects may empower woreda-\eve\ officials be­
cause those projects naturally benefit from local 
expertise.
Donor Governments
Donors also want to see Ethiopia achieve food 
security. The kind of funding donors provide, 
however, depends on domestic politics, not neces­
sarily on what is most effective. For example, even 
if the Government of Ethiopia supports cash trans­
fers, donors will not provide the needed cash. In 
the United States, domestic food producers, 
NGOs, and the shipping industry form an "iron 
triangle" that ensures the provision of in-kind food 
aid produced domestically in donor countries. The 
Coalition for Food Aid lobby represents 14 U.S.- 
based NGOs that rely heavily on food aid for 
funding. To get legislative backing for food aid 
programs, they depend on domestic food pro­
ducers and maritime interest groups, which in turn 
insist on domestic sourcing and shipping of the 
food in the legislation to ensure a handsome profit 
for themselves. The shipping markups on food aid 
cargo are one reason why domestically sourced 
food aid is so inefficient (Barrett and Maxwell 
2005). On the other hand, the European Commis­
sion, the second-largest donor, has moved to cash
donations [Clay 2005], Different donors also have 
varying levels of support for conditionality of 
transfers. Whereas the UK Department for Inter­
national Development argues that social cash trans­
fers should be unconditional in African countries, 
the World Bank encourages conditional cash trans­
fer schemes [Schuber and Slater 2006],
The World Food Programme (WFP) and 
Other NGQs
WFP and NGO interests are aligned with the inter­
ests of their donors [mainly the European Union, 
Japan, and the United States], The WFP feeds some 
6 million people in Ethiopia, consisting of 1.7 
million of the total 2.6 million people requiring 
emergency food assistance; 1 million through tar­
geted supplementary feeding; 1.75 million through 
food transfers under the PSNP; 110,000 orphans 
and vulnerable children infected or affected by 
HIV/AIDS; 7 5 0 ,0 0 0  people through land rehabili­
tation programs; 6 3 0 ,0 0 0  children through school 
feeding; and 100,000 refugees (WFP 2006). 
Although general food aid is mostly sourced from 
developed countries, the WFP relies heavily on local 
purchases and triangular transactions to source 
food for delivery to FFW programs. A local pur­
chase occurs when a food aid donor buys the food 
aid on the national markets of the country to 
which it is donating the food. Triangular purchases 
occur when a food donor buys food aid for a 
developing country in another developing country 
(usually close to the country where the food aid 
will be shipped).
In 2 0 0 0  NGOs monetized 26 percent of food aid, 
meaning that food sourced from developed coun­
tries was sold on local markets in developing coun­
tries in order to fund social programs. Some 
observers argue that monetized food aid can con­
tribute to economic growth by generating revenues 
for development and that in public works programs 
monetized food aid can generate assets such roads 
and dams. On the other hand, many argue that 
food aid monetization has disrupted food markets, 
labor markets, and production incentives [Jayne 
1997).
The Chronically Poor
The chronically poor are defined by their lack of 
assets, high dependency ratios, residence in remote 
locations, low-return occupations, chronic illness,
and social barriers. Significant and short-term trans­
fers enable this group to cross crucial thresholds, 
such as investing in productive assets instead of 
consuming them, and thereby make it possible for 
them to switch to positive growth trajectories that 
can carry them out of persistent poverty (Barrett 
and Maxwell 2005).
Chronic food insecurity results from structural 
problems and as such cannot be overcome by peri­
odic interventions using food from the strategic 
reserve. Instead, programs aimed at identifying and 
conquering the underlying reasons for the popula­
tion's inability to produce sufficient food or other 
tradable outputs are needed (Lynton-Evans 1997). 
Thus meeting the supplementary food needs of 
such population groups is not normally considered 
a function of a strategic grain reserve, but rather 
an area for specialized relief programs, such as FFE, 
food-for-training (FFT), and mother and child 
health initiatives.
The Transitory Poor
Transitory hunger associated with short-term crises 
represents a relatively small share of hunger world­
wide, with estimates ranging from 10 to 25 percent. 
Most malnutrition in the world arises owing to 
chronic deprivation and vulnerability [Holden et al. 
2006). The transitory poor benefit from social 
protection programs like FFW.
Vulnerable Members of Households
Intrahousehold distribution is often skewed toward 
the more powerful members of the family, whereas 
vulnerable members like young children and preg­
nant or lactating women are left hungry. Women 
are more vulnerable to shocks because of weaker 
property rights. They often bear a larger share of 
the burden of household coping, such as caring for 
the sick, elderly, and young; foraging for extra 
food; dropping out of school; or diversifying into 
urban informal labor markets [World Bank 2001).
Policy Options
Public Works
Besides providing short-term relief, such as creating 
jobs for the unemployed and providing transfers to 
those without savings or access to credit, public 
works programs work toward long-term deveiop-
ment objectives by providing insurance against 
income shocks. There is already widespread donor 
support for the 2 0 0 4  PSNP, which incorporates 
FFW as well as a highly desirable and ground­
breaking cash transfer component. The transitory 
poor benefit from the FFW part of the program.
Public works are more expensive to implement than 
pure relief, however, and require resources beyond 
unskilled labor, such as technical and managerial 
support. One study estimates that the annual cost 
of a job in a public works scheme can range from 
U S$4,000 to US$14,000 at purchasing-power par­
ity exchange rates [Subbarao 1997). FFW also has a 
distortion effect with respect to labor allocation. If 
FFW programs create low-quality unsustainable 
goods and divert labor resources away from private 
endeavors, FFW can undermine long-term produc­
tivity [Holden et al. 2006). In 1996 the government 
of neighboring Eritrea canceled all food for work 
in the belief that it diverted labor from agriculture 
and depressed production [Jayne 1997).
Conditional and Unconditional Transfers
Transfers help maintain ex post food security and 
keep the vulnerable from engaging in detrimental 
coping mechanisms that lead to poverty traps. Free 
food will, however, result in reduced food prices, 
which are detrimental to producers trying to sell 
their food. Furthermore, a public transfer to a 
household does not mean that everyone in the 
household will benefit. The head of the household 
may use his or her power to use social protection 
program benefits to meet unnecessary wants, such 
as cigarettes or alcohol [Pinstrup-Andersen 2005).
The government could expand the PSNP and start 
supporting other conditional work programs such 
as FFE or FFT. Lack of cash resources might make 
in-kind payment the only available option. This shift 
would lead to the inclusion of cargo net programs 
targeted at those in chronic poverty. Worldwide, 
those in chronic poverty are 7 5 -9 0  percent of the 
poor, and those in transitory poverty only 10-25 
percent.
The FFW component of the PSNP could be aban­
doned altogether, with a renewed focus on just the 
transfer component. Conditional transfer programs 
are not useful, however, for households that can­
not meet the conditionality. For example, a single 
mother may not be able to leave her children
unattended to go to a training program. A person 
who is sick with AIDS may not be able to provide 
labor in an EGS, FFW, FFE, or FFT program. On 
the other hand, unconditional transfers may reduce 
the incentive to earn income through work 
[Pinstrup-Andersen 2005).
Targeting
Targeting of food aid decreases the degree to 
which public assistance crowds out private safety 
nets, such as loans from relatives, and reduces 
market distortions that result from substitution 
effects that occur when people take in-kind pay­
ment instead of buying food on the local market. 
On the other hand, targeting can provide a per­
verse incentive effect to households who may 
choose to behave badly in order to qualify for 
food assistance [Brown and Gentilini 2006). Some 
built-in leakage to people who are not poor but 
who are needed for the program to survive may be 
desirable [Pinstrup-Andersen 1988). For example, 
social capital can be fostered if a public works pro­
gram allows all members of the society to work on 
it, and not just the poorest.
Even if the government decides to target specific 
populations, there may be errors of inclusion or 
exclusion. Clay et al. [1999) examined the food aid 
receipts of 4,218 rural households in Ethiopia in 
1995/96 and concluded that food aid targeting 
exhibits high errors of exclusion and inclusion at 
both the woreda and household levels [Holden et 
al. 2002). In an FFW program, setting the food or 
cash wage below the market wage for unskilled 
labor will attract only needy households to the 
program. When wages are paid in kind, the use of 
an inferior good will help self-targeting. There may 
be individuals within wealthy households, however, 
who have a different opportunity cost of labor and 
would participate in a public works program (Jayne 
1997). Errors of exclusion occur if, for example, 
social outcasts are crowded out of transfer 
programs by elites (Holden et al. 2002).
Cash or In-Kind Distribution
Because of issues of transport, spoilage, and pack­
aging, distributing food is often more logistically 
challenging than distributing cash, and thus food is 
more costly to deliver. Cash allows recipients to 
maximize their utility function more efficiently than 
an in-kind transfer. If the cash is used to buy food
on local markets, it will stimulate producers in that 
region. There are, however, several reasons why 
food or food-linked transfers may be preferred:
1. the impact on food-related outcomes, 
such as child calorie consumption and 
health care utilization, may be greater;
2. in food-deficit areas with disrupted or 
unresponsive markets, cash transfers 
would result in increasing food prices;
3. security costs may be lower for dis­
tributing food than for cash;
4. cash and food are often not substitut­
able in terms of donor resource avail­
ability; and
5. political support for food-linked trans­
fers may be higher [Brown and 
Gentilini 2006],
Where hyperinflation prevails, food can be a very 
effective payment medium because it retains its real 
value in the face of rapidly changing nominal prices 
(Holden et al. 2002], In-kind transfers also work 
well in areas where the cash economy is a man's 
world while food is the responsibility of women. If 
intrahousehold resource competition exists, then 
food may be a more effective medium than cash 
for indirect targeting of transfers to needy bene­
ficiaries (Holden et al. 2002).
Self-Sufficiency
To reduce the exposure to export commodity price 
fluctuations, the Government of Ethiopia could 
adopt policies that promote the use of national 
agricultural production for food self-sufficiency 
instead of promoting crops for export. Under this 
approach, farmers would be able to feed them­
selves, regardless of slumps in world coffee prices. 
Improving access to markets has been widely 
recognized as an important element of successful 
development, however, and the historical success 
rate of self-sufficiency strategies is dismal. Political 
support for this option would be difficult to obtain 
as donors and international organizations like the 
World Trade Organization and World Bank would 
protest.
Subsidies
Input subsidies on seeds or fertilizer help increase 
productivity during food shortages and thus
provide a coping mechanism. If farmers are grow­
ing for export (a small portion of the poor), like 
coffee growers, input subsidies allow them to sell 
their coffee below the cost of production, increas­
ing the competitiveness of Ethiopian coffee on 
world markets. In the current climate of trade 
liberalization, however, donors may retaliate for 
these trade-distorting subsidies. Instead of pro­
ducer input subsidies, the government could pur­
sue price subsidies for consumers. For example, the 
Egyptians famously subsidize bread consumption. 
Domestic political support for such a policy is easy 
to garner, as everyone benefits. For both consumer 
and producer subsidies, however, those who buy 
more or produce more of the subsidized com­
modity benefit more, skewing benefits toward 
richer households [Brown and Gentilini 2006). For 
this policy to be effective, consumer subsidies 
would have to apply to an inferior good consumed 
by the poor [for example, yellow maize rather than 
white maize) or be geographically targeted to a 
poor area.
Strategic Grain Reserve
To ensure the availability of food, the government 
could promote the strategic grain reserve. Public 
sector procurement and storage can stabilize food 
prices, since food price instability is an issue in 
Ethiopia (Gabre-Madhin 1999). Currently, Ethiopia 
does not use its reserves for price stabilization, so 
one option is for the government to start using its 
food reserves in this manner. Price stabilization 
comprises two concepts—producer price support 
and consumer price stabilization. Under producer 
price support, a floor price is set at which the 
agency charged with operating the price stabiliza­
tion policy, normally the parastatal grain agency, is 
required to buy all grain offered that meets a 
quality specification. In other words, the agency 
becomes the buyer of last resort. Consumer price 
stabilization aims at capping consumer price levels 
at a declared ceiling price. This step would usually 
occur in the later part of the marketing year when 
there is pressure on prices to rise as stocks start to 
run low. Once consumer prices reach the ceiling or 
trigger price, grain would be released from the 
reserve into the market in an attempt to hold 
prices at the ceiling level (Lynton-Evans 1997).
Enhancing the size and function of the strategic 
grain reserve is complementary to other social 
protection programs that ensure access to food for
both the chronic and transitory poor. The urban 
poor would benefit especially because the strategic 
grain reserve would ensure availability of food. 
Ethiopia must decide, however, whether to hold 
stocks in cash or in kind. The Government of 
Ethiopia may not feel justified in holding millions 
of dollars' worth of stocks in a strategic reserve if 
those funds are desperately needed for more 
immediate concerns. A  cash reserve would also 
mean that food would have to be bought on quick 
notice, which may not be possible in a widespread 
emergency.
Income Diversification
Is it more desirable for the government to pro­
mote programs that prevent shocks? Income diver­
sification poses such an opportunity. Promoting 
diversification of livelihoods may not always be 
effective, however. Sen's 1981 famine analysis shows 
that crop failures can cause a collapse in demand 
for local services, so diversification into the service 
sector may not help. If the government steps in 
and provides FFW at a guaranteed wage, it 
increases available off-farm activities, thereby 
enabling diversification. Profitable diversification 
into the most lucrative activities such as masonry, 
carpentry, and petty trade is often impossible for 
the poor owing to entry barriers [Woldenhanna 
and Oskam 2001], One option for overcoming 
these barriers is government support for rural 
credit to help loosen capital constraints.
Assignment
Your assignment is to  design a new social protec­
tion program that incorporates various forms of 
social assistance and social insurance for the 
Government of Ethiopia, taking into account the 
different interests of stakeholders and the nature of 
the risk, coping strategies, and poverty the 
vulnerable are facing.
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